Science Says (reprise)

 It is, for me, in the nature of blogging, that one writes somewhat off the cuff. Therefore, I don't expect or intend to make definitive statements here. However, looking back on a previous post, 'Science Says . . .', I think I need to revisit it. On the whole, I am satisfied with what I wrote there, as far as it went. What I do think needs some correction is that I addressed the argument of the article I was criticising as if it was advocating what is known as 'eliminative materialism': the philosophical view that consciousness does not exist. I think the language of the article is itself confused enough to give this impression in places, but the writers of the article seem to be professing epiphenomenalism: the idea that consciousness is nothing over and above a side-effect of the physical workings of the brain. 

There is a great deal to criticise in the article, and I certainly can't do it all in one sitting, but perhaps I will begin revisiting my criticism here, with this blog post, and continue later. I think the article warrants criticism, not because it is well argued or in any way substantive, but because it is so typical of contemporary views of the subject matter, because the authors are throwing around the weight of some quite heavy qualifications, and because the worldview they espouse is, I believe, as pernicious as it is nonsensical. In fact, when it comes to beliefs, I am not sure I can think of anything worse. The usual beliefs against which people fight, which allow or encourage human abuses, are all, in my view, subsets of the kind of belief being peddled by Peter Halligan and David A Oakley. 

So, I'll begin. Here is the first excerpt from the article:

"Beliefs about consciousness can be roughly divided into two camps. There are those who believe consciousness is like a ghost in the machinery of our brains, meriting special attention and study in its own right. And there are those, like us, who challenge this, pointing out that what we call consciousness is just another output generated backstage by our efficient neural machinery."

This is flat out 'dumb'. No one, I think, who has studied philosophy, thinks, "I believe in a ghost in the machinery of our brains." The term 'ghost in the machine' was invented by Gilbert Ryle as a kind of mocking summary of Cartesian dualism. In other words, Messrs Halligan and Oakley cannot even introduce the position they are arguing against in neutral terms. They only seem to know of it in the terms invented by its detractors. Also, to say beliefs about consciousness are divided into two camps, one of which is (a caricature of) Cartesian dualism, does not even rise to the level of oversimplification, but I will try and look at this in more detail later.

For now, I will try and give some preliminary remarks about what seems to be the heart of the article:

"Our recent paper argues that consciousness involves no separate independent psychological process distinct from the brain itself, just as there’s no additional function to digestion that exists separately from the physical workings of the gut.

"While it’s clear that both the experience and content of consciousness are real, we argue that, from a science explanation, they are epiphenomenal: secondary phenomena based on the machinations of the physical brain itself. In other words, our subjective experience of consciousness is real, but the functions of control and ownership we attribute to that experience are not."

 It's even hard to comment on writing quite this confused. For instance, "no separate independent psychological process distinct from the brain itself". So, the brain is a psychological process? I will not dwell on that, though it looks to me to be a kind of conceptual moebius strip of nonsense. We can then question whether the comparison with the gut is helpful. To say 'digestion' and 'workings of the gut' and put an equals sign between them raises no question. To say 'consciousness' and 'the (workings of) the physical brain' and put an equals sign between them, is clearly not in the same case. One cannot refer to digestion without referring to the working of the gut. One can refer to brains without referring to minds, and vice versa. So the difference between the two is like that between saying A = A and saying A = B. The former is self-evident. The latter might be true, but needs to be demonstrated. There is more for me to say on this, but, again, I'll save it for now.

Let us be clear now what epiphenomenalism involves. What is epiphenomenal has no causal powers. Your experience of thirst, for instance, does not make you drink water, on this view. You would have drunk water anyway, with or without the experience, as a matter of the pure physical causation of the brain in the body. While you might be able to think of examples in which your experience is, indeed, redundant to the action performed, if epiphenomenalism is true, there is never any experience that has causal powers. Think of what a claim it is that Halligan and Oakley are making. It entails that nothing that was written in their article was the result of conscious thoughts in the minds of either of them. On this score, at least, I can believe it. 

I will continue this in a later post.